COMMENTS
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL AID-FROM ALLEN TO LEMON
TO TILTON-OUT AT SECOND, SAFE AT FIRST
THE KEY ELEMENTS

Shortly after the Board of Education v. Allen' decision by the
Supreme Court, which upheld a New York State statute 2 permitting
textbook loans to parochial school children, many viewed the ruling
as ushering in an era during which the United States Supreme Court
would openly sanction increasingly direct forms of public financial
assistance to the hard-pressed parochial school systems throughout the
Nation. About one year after the Allen decision, Professor Paul A.
Freund of Harvard University Law School observed:
The case is obviously the beginning, not the end, of constitutional
litigation-now fostered in the case of federal programs by the decision in Flast v. Cohen [392 U.S. 83 (1968)], recognizing federal taxpayers' suits-to determine the bounds of public aid to parochial
schools.... Gone is the elaborate minuet of the individual student's request for specific books and its approval by the public
school board; all is now modern ballet, bold and muscular.
Will the Court re-score its composition to accommodate the
more probably, require a re-comnew movement? . . . [I]t would,
3
position of the Court itself.
1 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
2 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 701(3) (McKinney 1968).
3 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1681-82 (1969)
(footnote omitted). The author was specifically referring to the Pennsylvania Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601 to 5609 (Supp.
1971), the statute constitutionally at issue in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
one of the principal decisions discussed in this comment. It should also be noted that at
the time of Allen the composition of the Court included Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas who were replaced thereafter by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun respectively. It is submitted that had this change not occurred, the decision in Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (a five-to-four decision affirming the constitutionality of
a federal school construction grant-in-aid statute), might have been to the contrary. In
Allen, Justices Brennan and Marshall and Chief Justice Warren voted with the majority
in approving textbook loans to parochial school children. However, Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined Justices Black and Douglas (two of the three Allen dissenters) in dissent
of the Tilton decision. It is conceivable that Chief Justice Warren, whose legal philosophy
was similar generally, might have also dissented in Tilton. Likewise, Justice Fortas, who
was the third Allen dissenter, might have taken a similar posture in Tilton. It is doubtful,
however, that the Warren Court would have decided the Lemon case any differently than
did the Burger Court. The recomposition which the Court is now undergoing will also
affect future decisions in the area but it would be speculative to attempt to predict the
degree.
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At approximately the same time, a student commentator in his
analysis of Allen concluded:
Having made the transition from police and fire protection
to bus fares and books, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court in the
face of post-Flast opposition will invalidate state legislative efforts
even beyond books .... The question is no longer if, but how far,

and it is a much shorter step from books to buildings than it was
from buses to books.4
On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court answered these questions
in two historic decisions, which in a most profound sense will affect the
future financial and political relationships between state and federal
governments and nonpublic sectarian educational institutions.
In the combined decisions of Lemon v. Kurtzman and Earley v.

DiCenso,5 the Court struck down as unconstitutional two state statutes"
designed to provide public aid to parochial school systems in the "bold
and muscular" manner characterized by Professor Freund. In so doing,
the Court clearly indicated that it was not ready to "re-score its composition" and disregard its previous posture toward government and religion within the framework of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. At the same time, however, it did indeed take the "short
step" from books to buildings in Tilton v. Richardson7 by upholding a
federal statute8 authorizing grants and loans to colleges and universities
irrespective of religious affiliations for the purpose of building "nonreligious" 9 academic facilities. Yet the step taken has left perhaps a
smaller footprint than those who foresaw it might have supposedparticularly those who envisioned such construction grants-in-aid being
extended to parochial primary and secondary schools through federal
or state action.
4 Note, Aid to Parochial Schools and the Establishment Clause-Everson to Allen:
From Buses to Books and Beyond, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 785, 800 (1969).
5 403 U.S. 602 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lemon].
6 The statute voided in Lemon was the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601 to 5609 (Supp. 1971). In DiCenso
the statute similarly affected was the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GM.
LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51-I et seq. (Supp. 1970).
7 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
8 Higher Education Facilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970).
9 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2) (1970) states in pertinent part:
The term "academic facilities" shall not include . . . (C) any facility used or
to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or (D) any
facility which (although not a facility described in the preceding clause) is used or
to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity . . . . For the purposes of this subparagraph, the term
"school or department of divinity" means an institution, or a department or
branch of an institution, whose program is specifically for the education of students to prepare them to become ministers of religion or to enter upon some other
religious vocation or to prepare them to teach theological subjects.
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In a manner of speaking, the situation resembles the aftermath
of an attempted double play in a baseball game-the runner at first
base (government transportation and textbook aid to nonpublic schools,
having reached there by virtue of Everson and Allen) is thrown out
moving to second (new and expanded state aid laws voided by Lemon);
however, the relay throw to first for the double play (on federal construction grants to nonpublic universities) is too late, and the batter is
safe on a close play (the five-to-four Tilton decision). The new runner
(government transportation, textbook, and building construction aid
to nonpublic schools) is perhaps faster and more powerful than his
predecessor, but he is not in any better scoring position.
Hence, the Lemon and Tilton decisions taken together appear to
be paradoxical; one restricts the posture of government toward religiously affiliated schools, the other expands the scope of permissible
aid. Yet these cases represent an interesting and, in retrospect, a predictable combination of constitutional reasoning and pragmatic application as developed by previous Supreme Court establishment clause
cases dealing with schools, government, and religion. Although the two
principal holdings seem incongruous at first glance,1 0 it is submitted
that the ultimate combined result is consistent and reasonable. 1
PAST LAW RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT QUESTION

To develop and justify this thesis, it is necessary first to briefly reconstruct the history of relevant establishment clause law which laid
the basis for the Tilton and Lemon decisions. The first case to raise
directly the establishment clause question with regard to government
aid for church supported institutions was Bradfield v. Roberts.12 In this
case, Congress had authorized the establishment of a hospital in the
District of Columbia for the purpose of caring for indigent patients
and had appropriated funds to compensate the hospital for the cost of
this care. The constitutional issue developed because the hospital which
undertook the activity was operated by a sisterhood of the Roman
Catholic Church. The Court held, however, that the appropriation did
not contravene the establishment clause because the purpose for which
the hospital existed was a wholly secular one:
10 An incongruity noted and discussed at length from opposite viewpoints in the
concurring and/or dissenting opinions in Lemon and Tilton. Compare 403 U.S. 602, 661-71
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) with 403 U.S. 672, 689-97 (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part) and 403 U.S. 602, 642-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 See Freund, supra note 3, at 1691-92.
12 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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It is simply the case of a secular corporation being managed by
people who hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church,
but who nevertheless are managing the [hospital] corporation according to the law under which it exists. 13
The significance of the Bradfield case is that it sustained for the
first time direct public aid to a sectarian institution and also that it
distinguished secular purposes as separable from religiously oriented
activities. 1 4 The decision was not destined to be of controlling importance in succeeding establishment clause cases, 15 but its logic seems
to have influenced the Tilton decision and is specifically cited therein.' 6
The right of parochial schools to provide educational instruction
as an alternative to public education was upheld by the Court in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.17 In this case, brought under the fourteenth amendment,' a Roman Catholic institution and a private nonsectarian military academy challenged the right of the State of Oregon to compel
children to attend only public schools. The Court invalidated the
statute on the ground that it unreasonably interfered with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their
children:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 19
The state's right to regulate and audit private schools with respect to
minimum education requirements and standards, however, was not
20
challenged.
The first question of state aid to children attending private
2
sectarian schools arose in Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education."
Here, a state statute authorizing the use of public funds to provide free
18 Id. at 298-99.
14 See Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Directions Without Dogma,

55 VA. L. REv. 579, 590-91 (1969).
15 Id. at 591.
16 403 U.S. at 679.
17 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18 The religious guarantees of the first amendment were not made applicable to the

states through the fourteenth amendment until Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296

(1940).
19 268 U.S. at 535.
20
21

Id. at 534.
281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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textbooks to children attending all schools in the state, including private
sectarian schools, was challenged as violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court, adopting the rationale of a
previous Louisiana Supreme Court finding, 22 stated that only the
children and the state were the true beneficiaries of the statute and concluded, therefore, that the taxing power of the state had been exercised
for a valid public purpose. 23 Cochran thus became the first decision to
adopt the theory that the state aid given directly to the students of
private sectarian schools was constitutionally permissible and that the
incidental benefits accruing therefrom to the religious institutions were
not sufficient to proscribe the activity.
It was another seventeen years, however, before the Court faced its
first bona fide establishment clause case-Everson v. Board of Educa25
tion.24 The circumstances in Everson involved a New Jersey statute
which permitted local school boards to reimburse parents from taxraised funds for the costs of transporting their children to school via
public buses. Among those eligible for bus fare reimbursement were
the parents whose children traveled in this manner to parochial schools.
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals upheld the statute, 26
reversing a lower court ruling. 27 Despite some doctrinaire rhetoric

regarding the meaning of the establishment clause, 28 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed Everson primarily on other grounds. It viewed
the bus fare refund statute merely as a valid form of public welfare,
similar in character to police and fire protection.2 9 It acknowledged
indirectly that the parochial school might receive incidental benefits
from the legislation, but no more than from other government services
established for the public good. In fact, the Court implied that a with22 Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).

23 281 U.S. at 375.
24 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
25 Law of June 9, 1941, ch. 191, [1941] N.J. Laws 581 (now N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:39-1
(Supp. 1971-72)).
26 Everson v. Board of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
27 Everson v. Board of Educ., 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
28 See, e.g., 330 U.S. at 15-16 where the Court stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. (Emphasis added).
29 Id. at 17-18.
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holding of such services might violate the free exercise clause of the
first amendment:
[C]utting off church schools from these services, so separate and
so indisputably marked off from the religious function, would make
it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously
not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state
to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them. 30
Thus, the Everson decision synthesized the separate principles
announced in Bradfield, Pierce,and Cochran.Although it did not make
specific reference to this aspect of the case, it clearly viewed the bus fare
refund as a wholly secular activity, unassociated with any religious objectives. It also reaffirmed the right of the parochial school to exist and
educate a portion of the nation's young, and it utilized the "child
benefit" theory to uphold the validity of the aid authorized by the New
31
Jersey statute.
Despite this first indication that the Court would be reluctant to
abrogate all forms of state aid which in some way benefited nonpublic
sectarian institutions, it would be another twenty-one years before the
parochial school aid question would again arise directly in Board of
Education v. Allen.32 In the interim, however, important tests and

precedents were being developed in related establishment clause cases
involving the states, schools, and religion. For example, the Court
declared unconstitutional a program whereby religious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were allowed to visit public school
buildings weekly, during regular school hours, and provide one-half
hour of voluntary religious instruction, in the place of normally
scheduled secular education. 33 Subsequently, however, a released time
program, whereby students were allowed to leave the school premises
and go to religious centers to engage in religious activities, was found
30 Id. at 18.
81 The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its
legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously
to and from accredited schools.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
32 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
83 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948):
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for
the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups
an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes
through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State.
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unobjectionable in Zorach v. Clauson.8 4 The Court again emphasized
the government's obligation to be "neutral" toward religious activities; 35 yet its interpretation of the work was beginning to impart a tone
of increasing benevolence, so long as public funds or facilities were
not directly employed in the process. 36 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged openly for the first time that constitutional separation of
church and state was a matter of degree and not an absolute.3 7 Other
clarifications of the Court's interpretation of state action and the
establishment clause followed in the early sixties. In a series of cases
concerning state Sunday closing laws, 88 the Court rejected contentions
that such laws respected an establishment of religion.39 So long as there
existed a valid secular goal, 40 the incidental benefit to some religious
activities, or in some instances a detriment, 41 did not prevent the state
from enacting such laws. Thus, more clearly endorsed were the concepts of "secular purpose" and "incidental benefits" as applied to a
state's posture toward religious activities.
Shortly after the closing law cases came those involving school
prayer and Bible reading. In Engel v. Vitale,42 the Court was once
again faced with a direct form of state participation in religious
84

343 U.S. 306 (1952).

385 Id. at 314.
86 Id. at 313-14.
87 Id. at 312.
38 See generally Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
89 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961):
[T]he "Establishment" Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets
of some or all religions. In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands such regulation.
40 Id. at 445. The Court stated:
The present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a uniform day of
rest for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the State from achieving its
secular goals.
Id.
41 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) where an Orthodox Jewish merchant
protested a Pennsylvania Sunday closing law because he could not legally open his store on
Sunday after having voluntarily closed on Saturday in observance of the Jewish Sabbath.
In rejecting plaintiff's petition, the Court declared:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute
is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. at 607.
42 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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activities-a voluntary daily prayer being said at the beginning of
each class day in New York public schools. In view of Everson, its re43
action was predictable; it declared the activity unconstitutional. It
reacted in a similar vein, in Abington School District v. Schempp, 44 to
state action requiring that public schools begin each day with readings
from the Bible. The primary significance of Schempp, however, was
the Court's consolidation of its criteria for assessing statutes which bear
on the establishment clause:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to
say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.45
It appears obvious that in Schempp, the Court felt the need to
provide solid guidelines by which legislators could fashion future
statutes dealing with education and religion. The response was the
pronouncement of the aforementioned test, despite the fact that the
issue in Schempp seemingly could have been decided without difficulty
on the strength of the Engel decision.
With its secular purpose and primary effect test in hand, the
Court in Sherbert v. Verner46 promptly overturned a state law which
denied unemployment compensation benefits to anyone who would
not accept work on a Saturday, even if such refusal to work were based
on religious scruples. Sherbert was, however, primarily a free exercise
clause case, and its principal holding involved a dispensation from a
statutory regulation rather than a subsidy to a religious entity. 47 There
43 [I]t is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program
carried on by government.
Id. at 425.
44 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
45 Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
46 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court characterized its opinion:
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the "establishment" of the
Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing
more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall. . . . Our
holding today is only that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions
respecting the day of rest.
Id. at 409-10.
47 See Freund, supra note 3, at 1688.
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were many who nevertheless interpreted this ruling to mean that the
extension of certain forms of public aid to sectarian schools might now
be constitutional, since the withholding of such aid because of religious
affiliation would be the same sort of discrimination present in
48
Sherbert.
The next milestone case, Flast v. Cohen,4 9 also did not turn, as it
developed, on the establishment clause, but rather on the standing of
a taxpayer to challenge expenditures made by the federal government
under federal aid to education legislation.5" Here, the Court held that
a federal taxpayer could properly challenge such expenditures as a
violation of the establishment clause, provided he could prove his
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation by demonstrating a
logical link between his status and the challenged statute, and by
further demonstrating that the statute exceeded specific constitutional
authority and that such excess directly affected his status. 51 This case
overruled, in effect, Frothingham v. Mellon,52 which had severely restricted this type of legal action in the past, and paved the way for
prompt and direct frontal assaults against any current or future
parochial school aid legislation. 53 Without this ruling, the plaintiffs in
Lemon and Tilton might also have been impaled on the Frothingham
case and would have been compelled to justify their standing on other
grounds (as did the plaintiff in Everson).
Shortly after Flast, the Court handed down the Allen decision in
which it sanctioned a New York statute allowing the loan of secular
textbooks, without charge, to parochial school children. Allen was the
first instance of the Schempp test being applied to a situation of this
type, and the Court concluded that NEw YORK EDUCATION LAW § 701
(McKinney 1969) adequately met the test of secular purpose and primary effect.54 The Court also reviewed the Everson case and deter-

mined that it, too, would have received a passing grade.3 5 The Court
48 Id. at 1687-88. Although Professor Freund rejected such a broad application for
the Sherbert case, he did suggest that it might support the legality of a shared-time program whereby parochial school children would journey to public schools during the
school day to receive some of their secular education.
49 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
50 The specific acts challenged were Titles I and 11 of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a) et seq., 821 et seq. (1970).
5' 392 U.S. at 102-03.
52 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
53 The substantive argument in Flast that the federal statute violated the establishment clause because its benefits extended to children attending church related schools
was never reached either by the lower courts or the Supreme Court; hence, the case was
remanded for further adjudication. 392 U.S. at 106 & n.26.
54 392 U.S. 236, 243.
55 Id.
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relied on the so-called "child benefit" theory as a further justification
for its finding of constitutionality in Allen and again characterized the
benefits to the school itself as incidental:
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are
furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at
least technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are furnished
to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools. Perhaps free books make it more likely that
some children choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was
true of the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone
demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution. 56
The Allen Court also appeared to have abandoned the public
welfare rationale of Everson as too narrow in extending permissible
aid to books as well as buses. 5T The practical effect of the Allen decision
was the creation of an optimistic atmosphere for proponents of
parochial school aid; the Court now seemed willing to interpret in a
liberal fashion increasingly overt forms of assistance. No doubt influenced by the liberality of Allen, many state legislatures began enacting statutes authorizing such forms of aid as salary subsidies to parochial
school teachers who only taught specific secular subjects58 and the
purchasing by the state of secular instruction from parochial schools.59
That such laws would soon be tested in the courts was evident from the
holding in Flast.
The final case which merits a brief review is the most recent
establishment clause case, Walz v. New York City Tax Commission.60
In upholding the constitutionality of tax exemptions for religious
properties, this highly significant decision introduced a new testing
criterion in addition to Schempp, and in so doing sounded the death
knell for the direct parochial school aid legislation challenged in
Lemon:
Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is
not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does
not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end
56 Id. at 243-44 (footnote omitted).

See Valente, supra note 14, at 590.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-43 (Supp. 1971-72); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 1651-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
59 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-52 (Supp. 1971-72); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5604
(Supp. 1971).
60 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see Note, Granting of Property Tax Exemptions to Religious
OrganizationsUpheld as Constitutional,2 STroN HALL L. Rav. 242 (1970).
57
58
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result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion.61
The Court clearly was concerned with this matter of government
entanglement in church affairs and in dictum expressed the view that "a
direct money subsidy [to a religious institution] would be a relationship pregnant with involvement.16 2 The great asset of a tax exemption
in the eyes of the Court, however, was this lack of relationship between
church and state. 63 Conversely, the Court did not view such an exemption as fostering religious activities in an unconstitutional sense.6 4 It
declined, however, as in Allen, to look upon the relationship as in the
scope of public or social welfare,6 5 thereby again rejecting that aspect
of the Everson rationale.

In summary, then, from the long progression of decisions, proponents of increased parochial school aid were encouraged by the
following factors:
(I) The Court seemed willing to permit certain forms of state aid
to parochial school systems, provided the state, children, and
parents were the direct recipients and beneficiaries of such
aid rather than the church.
(2) Further, the Court did not seem to consider government
actions which incidentally or indirectly benefitted the religious
organizations as a bar, provided there existed a valid secular
purpose and that religious activities were neither fostered nor
fettered.
(3) The Court's interpretation of governmental neutrality toward
religion appeared to be a benevolent one.
Opponents of parochial school aid, however, also had grist for
their mill.
(1) The Court had approved only two peripheral forms of aid
until now, and the more robust forms had yet to be tested.
(2) The Court had consistently and absolutely rejected all direct
involvement between church and state where the latter's
facilities and property were employed.
(3) The Court's newly announced "entanglement" test was a key
factor not considered in earlier cases, and its effect was more
61 397 U.S. at 674
62 id. at 675.
63 Id. at 675-76.
64 Id. at 672-73,
a5

Id. at 672.

(emphasis added).
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likely to limit, rather than broaden the scope of permissible
aid.
(4) Although dicta at the time, the Court in Everson and in Walz
had very strongly expressed its skepticism toward direct state
aid to religious organizations.
Lemon-ENTANGLEMENT

IS THE KEY

The Lemon case arose as a taxpayer's suit challenging the validity
of Pennsylvania's Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, 66 which authorized the State Superintendent of Public Instruction
to contract for the purchase of "secular educational services" from all
certified nonpublic schools in the state irrespective of sectarian influence or affiliation. The primary beneficiaries of this law were, of
course, the parochial school systems operated by the Roman Catholic
Church. The purchased services consisted only of teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials,67 and the "secular" subjects involved were restricted to mathematics, modern foreign languages,
physical science, and physical education.68 The schools receiving the
aid were subject to state accounting and auditing procedures, and the
Act was funded by capital generated from horse racing taxes, and later,
cigarette taxes.
Earley v. DiCenso69 likewise challenged a less comprehensive but
equally bold statute, the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act.7 0 This

law provided for a 15% salary supplement to nonpublic school teachers
at schools where the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education
was below the public school average. To qualify for aid, a teacher was
66 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601 to 5609 (Supp. 1971).
67 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5603(6) (Supp. 1971).
68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5604 (Supp. 1971).
69 403 U.S. 602 (Nos. 569 and 570) (1970). The suit was brought originally by plaintiffs
DiCenso and others, citizens and taxpayers of the State of Rhode Island, against defendants
Robinson and others, state officials responsible for administration of the Salary Supplement
Act. In addition, Earley and others, a couple with children in parochial schools and
several teachers eligible for aid under the statute were permitted to intervene under FED.
R. Civ. P. 24(b) as co-defendants. The case was reported in the federal district court
as DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970) but the Supreme Court assigned
No. 569 to Earley v. DiCenso and No. 570 to Robinson v. DiCenso and reported the case as
part of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970). It was noted by the district
court that 250 teachers had applied for the aid and all were employed by Roman Catholic
schools. It was also noted that approximately 95% of the elementary school children attending non-public schools in Rhode Island were enrolled in Roman Catholic elementary
schools. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 115 (D.R.I. 1970).
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required to have received a teaching certificate, taught a course similar
to those offered in Rhode Island's public schools, utilized state-approved
textbooks, and agreed not to teach any classes in religion. 71 Also present
in this statute were accounting and auditing procedures and requirements, and the appropriations for the act were tax-supported.
A three-judge federal district court was convened in both cases,
since the respective complainants sought to enjoin state laws as repugnant to the Constitution. 72 In the Lemon case, the district court upheld
the Pennsylvania statute on the ground that the state could aid the
secular functions of a private sectarian institution without violating the
establishment clause,73 and in so doing, would not advance religion
within the meaning of Schempp.74 Furthermore, the use to which the
funds were put, and not the recipient's identity, was the primary concern. 75 "Entanglement" was not discussed since the case was decided
before Walz. 76 Hence, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause for which relief could be granted. Chief Circuit Judge
Hastie dissented on the ground that the so-called "contract" arrangement was an artificial facade designed to camouflage its questionable
constitutional character.7 7 He also expressed great concern over the
"intermingling of politics and religion":
It is difficult to imagine a type of intrusion by the state more offensive to a religious community than such pervasive monitoring and
investigation of instruction and academic organization in order to
purge the secular areas of the curriculum of religious orientation.
Yet, it is to just such intrusion that the Pennsylvania statute opens
the door .... 78

In DiCenso v. Robinson,79 the opposite result was reached. The
district court in this case declined to segregate the secular activities from
the religious or the teachers from their employers in applying the
"primary effect" test.80 Furthermore, it had the advantage of a recent
mandate by the Supreme Court which the Lemon court did not-the
71 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-3 (Supp. 1970).

72 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970).
73 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
74 Id. at 47.
75 Id. at 48-49.

76 The case also dealt extensively with standing and declared that only those plaintiffs
who had actually paid the tax by attending the horse races had legal standing to challenge
the statute. Id. at 4043.
77 Id. at 50.
78 Id. at 52.

79 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
80 Id. at 119-20.
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Walz test. Its perceptive interpretation of the meaning of Walz was
obviously the key factor influencing the outcome:
Walz thus makes it clear that the test of a statute's effect is not
whether the secular result is more important than the religious result, nor whether the activity aided is in form secular, but whether
the degree of entanglement required by the statute is likely to promote the substantive evils against which the First Amendment
guards.

81

Further, in declaring the Salary Supplement Act unconstitutional,
the DiCenso court was also concerned with its potentially bad side
effects:
At some point the school becomes "public" for more purposes than
the Church could wish. At that point, the Church may justifiably
feel that its victory on the Establishment Clause has meant abandonment of the Free Exercise Clause.82
Thus, in this state of conflict, the two cases advanced to the
Supreme Court, 3 where both statutes were held unconstitutional in an
opinion by Chief Justice Burger (who also authored the Walz
opinion), 4 As in the lower DiCenso court, the overriding issue on which
both cases turned was entanglement. Although the Court did not challenge the "secular legislative purposes" of the statutes, 5 it found that
the relationships between church and state were so intertwined by the
manner in which the aid was given that any consideration of the
"primary effect" portion of the Schempp test was precluded:
We need not decide whether these legislative precautions restrict
81 Id. at 120.
82 Id. at 122. The district court also rejected the notion that the free exercise
clause demanded state aid to parochial schools, suggested by some as the meaning of
Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398 (1963):
Certainly it would be anomalous if the First Amendment required the state
to exclude religion from the public schools but at the same time to support an
entire school system in order to facilitate the teaching of religion.
316 F. Supp. at 123.
83 In the meantime several other cases of a similar nature also received lower court
adjudication. In Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970) a three-judge court
invalidated a Connecticut statute (CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. §§ 10-281a et seq. (Supp.
1971-72)) similar in nature to the Pennsylvania law in Lemon. Like the district court in
DiCenso, it relied heavily upon the Walz test. This judgment was ultimately affirmed
without opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court in 403 U.S. 955 (1971). State courts have also
divided on the question. Compare, Williams v. Seeger, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971) (Louisiana salary supplement law declared unconstitutional) with In re Legislature's Request For An Opinion, 384 Mich. 82, 180 N.W.2d 265
(1970) (Michigan salary supplement law held valid).
84 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
85 Id. at 613.
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the principal or primary effect of the programs to the point where
they do not offend the Religion Clauses, for we conclude that the
cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.8 6
The criteria which the Court used to examine the level of entanglement were: (1) the character and purposes of the institutions
benefited; (2) the nature of the state aid provided; and (3) the resulting
relationship between the state and the sectarian institutions receiving
the aid.8 7 Through such an analysis, the Court found three areas of
excessive entanglement. Centering specifically upon the Rhode Island
statute, it concurred with the lower court in DiCenso that the propagation of the Roman Catholic faith was one of the chief purposes of the
parochial school system."" This fact, it concluded, assured that the
operation of the school, including the teachers employed therein, was
dominated by religious authority.8 9 Consequently, it viewed the attempt
of such teachers to remain religiously neutral to be an extremely difficult task, if not an impossible one, even though such individuals
taught only purely secular subjects. 90 Given such difficulties, the need
for comprehensive state surveillance to ensure that its aid was not
fostering religious activities would, in the Court's opinion, be an
enduring requirement and, hence, an excessive entanglement:
Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine
the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective
acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. 91
The second area of entanglement the Court considered excessive
was the inspection, accounting, and auditing procedures of both
statutes. This factor was declared to be particularly obnoxious because
it created a "relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of churches. ' 92 And finally,
the third area of objectionable entanglement was found to be the intermingling of politics and religion brought about by such direct forms
of state aid, thereby encouraging future political action along religious
lines-a danger the religion clauses were designed to prevent. 93
at 613-14.
at 615.
at 615-16.
at 617-18.
at 618-19.
at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 622-24.

86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92
93
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The Court also condemned the Pennsylvania statute in itself for
directly aiding sectarian schools, and distinguished it from the forms
of aid held valid in Everson and Allen. 91 Consequently, it strongly implied that, had the primary effect issue been reached, this piece of
legislation might have run aground at that point. Although the Rhode
Island law was not assigned this same deficiency, the Court plainly indicated that it was not prepared to equate aid to teachers with the
child benefit theories of Cochran and Allen, primarily again because of
the employer-employee relationship between church and teacher. 95 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas did, however, reach the "primary
effect" question and declared that both statutes were, in his opinion,
unconstitutional on this ground as well as for excessive entanglement.9 6
Tilton-A

MATTER OF DEGREE

In contrast to Lemon, the Court, with one exception,9 7 upheld the
U.S. Higher Education Facilities Act of 196398 in Tilton v. Richardson.99 This statute was established for the purpose of aiding public and
94 Id. at 621.

95 Id. at 617. Justice Douglas expressed a similar fear with respect to textbooks in his
dissenting opinion in Allen:
[T]he statutory system provides that the parochial school will ask for the books
that it wants. Can there be the slightest doubt that the head of the parochial
school will select the book or books that best promote its sectarian creed?
If the board of education supinely submits by approving and supplying the
sectarian or sectarian-oriented textbooks, the struggle to keep church and state
separate has been lost. If the board resists, then the battle line between church
and state will have been drawn and the contest will be on to keep the school
board independent or to put it under church domination and control.
392 U.S. at 256. Justice Fortas expressed similar concerns in his dissenting opinion in
Allen. Id. at 269-72.
96 It matters not that the teacher receiving taxpayers' money only teaches religion a fraction of the time. Nor does it matter that he or she teaches no religion.
The school is an organism living on one budget. What the taxpayers give for
salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science without any trace of
proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for religious training.
403 U.S. at 641.
97 One provision in Tilton was held to be unconstitutional: the section of the
statute which limited the federal interest in the facilities to twenty years (20 U.S.C.
§ 754(b)(2) (1970)). This section stipulated, in effect, that after twenty years, sectarian use
of the facilities for religious as well as non-religious purposes would not be subject to
federal censure. The Court declared that the federal interest must be perpetual and that
to allow that section of the statute to stand would be to allow in essence a contribution
by the government to a religious organization in clear violation of the establishment
clause. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971).
98 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-758 (1970).
99 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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private colleges and universities in the form of construction grants for
buildings and facilities devoted to secular educational pursuits. The
Act was challenged by fifteen taxpayer plaintiffs located in Connecticut,
who objected to such aid being given to four Connecticut colleges
operated by the Roman Catholic Church. The plaintiffs contended that
the Act did not authorize construction grants to religiously affiliated
institutions or, in the alternative, that such grants violated the establishment clause or the free exercise clause of the first amendment, or both.
A three-judge federal district court upheld the Act against all the plaintiffs' claims, 10 0 primarily through the use of the Schempp-Allen test. 1 1
As was true in the Lemon case at the district court level, this decision
preceded by two months the Supreme Court's Walz decision; hence
the issue of entanglement was not discussed.
Application of the entanglement test, however, did not alter the
result, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In contrast to Lemon, where
there was near unanimity of opinion, the five-to-four majority in Tilton
consisted of a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Burger and
joined by three other justices, plus a hostile concurring opinion by
Justice White. 10 2 The Chief Justice clearly recognized the need to reconcile this decision with the rationale of Lemon, and great effort was
expended in this regard.
The plurality first answered affirmatively the question as to
whether the Facilities Act was intended to apply to sectarian as well as
nonsectarian universities. 103 It then launched directly into a consideration of the primary effects test and conclusively stated that buildings,
like bus transportation, books, and tax exemptions, did not per se
represent impermissible government aid to religion. 0 4 Furthermore, it
saw nothing wrong with direct state aid to sectarian institutions as a
10 5
general principle, provided there was no advancement of religion.
Although in Lemon the plurality was unwilling to separate secular and
religious school activities as a basis for affirming the statutes in question,
it was quite prepared to do so in Tilton, and it relied heavily on
100 Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970).
101 Id. at 1197-99.
102 Justice White contended that the Rhode Island statute was constitutional as well
as the U.S. Higher Educational Facilities Act; however, he would have remanded the
Pennsylvania statute for a determination of its validity as applied to the particular facts
of the case. 403 U.S. at 671 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103 403 US. 672, 676-77.
104 Id. at 679.
105 Id. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), was specifically relied upon as
authority.
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evidentiary testimony and environmental differences between colleges
and secondary schools to make the distinction. 10 8 It concluded that
the defendant colleges had adequately demonstrated that the facilities
provided under the Act had not been and would not be utilized for
religious purposes, and that their institutions operated in a milieu of
academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination. 10 7 Therefore,
they were properly eligible for aid under the Act.
The major discussion again centered on the entanglement issue,
and the plurality concluded that there were several distinguishing
features between Tilton and Lemon which justified a different result.
First, Chief Justice Burger contrasted the respective missions of
secondary schools (religiously oriented in large measure) with that of
colleges (more academically oriented in secular terms and tempered by
the internal discipline of academic freedom) and concluded that, since
religious indoctrination was not a substantial activity of the defendant
colleges, as proven by the evidence at hand, there was less risk of the
government's aid advancing religion, and hence, less need for intensive
government surveillance. 0 8 The Chief Justice further justified the
distinction on the ground that college students were "less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination" than secondary
school pupils. 10 9 Although one might agree with the former conclusion
as sound pragmatic reasoning, the latter argument seems a dubious
legal premise on which to justify a major decision in constitutional law,
and perhaps it would have been better left unsaid. As Justice White
pointed out, however, it represented "makeweight" dialogue, 110 and
other factors were more controlling in the outcome of Tilton.
Such a factor was the "non-ideological" nature of the aid provided,
namely, buildings. The plurality viewed such structures as libraries,
language laboratories, and the like as possessing the crucial quality of
inherent religious neutrality not attributed to teachers in DiCenso.
Consequently, said the Chief Justice, the risks of government aid to
religion and the corresponding need for surveillance were therefore
reduced."' Also, the plurality was influenced by the fact that the aid
was given in the form of a "one-time, single-purpose construction
grant," 112 which, unlike the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania programs,
106 403 U.S. 672, 680-82.
107 Id. at 681. The Court also noted that other more religiously oriented universities
had in fact been refused aid under the Act. Id. at 682.
108 Id. at 685-86.
109 Id. at 686.
110 403 U.S. 602, 668 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
111 403 US. 672, 687-88.
112 Id. at 688.
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required no continuing forms of regulation and auditing procedures."I3
The dissenting justices in Tilton generally believed that the federal
statute violated the establishment clause on the grounds of excessive
entanglement and advancement of a religion. In short, they saw no
distinction between the Tilton situation and Lemon. 114 Justice White,
who affirmed Tilton but who dissented on the establishment clause
question in Lemon, also found no distinction between the two cases.
However, he viewed the refusal of state aid to parochial schools as a
denial of the right to educate children according to one's religious
beliefs-such denial being brought about by intolerable financial
burdens." 5 He also stated that the Court's holding in Lemon effectively
precluded any meaningful forms of state aid to church-related schools
because it had forged a "damned if you do or don't" paradox by prohibiting aid where religion and secular subjects were taught in the same
classroom and by likewise prohibiting aid where the state entangled
itself with religion by exacting from the school a promise to separate
the two. 116 Justice White also chided the Court's rationale for declaring
that on the one hand, parochial school teachers were incapable of
remaining religiously neutral, whereas the same rationale did not apply
to college professors. 117 In summary, he placed considerably more
emphasis on the free exercise aspects of the question, an issue dismissed
abruptly by Chief Justice Burger in Tilton.118
THE LESSONS OF

Lemon

AND

Tilton

When the two cases are paired and viewed in relation to the law,
Lemon and Tilton illustrate what now represents a reasonably clear
formula by which to test proposed parochial school aid. Direct forms of
state aid to sectarian educational institutions are constitutionally permissible provided that three precedent conditions are satisfied: (a) the
primary mission of the school is secular education rather than religious
training; (b) the aid given possesses inherent religious neutrality easily
ascertained and controlled; and (c) such aid does not require complex
regulation and auditing procedures on a perpetual basis. However,
where direct aid plans do foster complicated and enduring regulatory
113 Id.

114 Id. at 692-93 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); 403 U.S. 602, 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115 403 US. 602, 665 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
116 Id. at 668.
117 Id.

118 403 U.S. 672, 689.
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procedures requiring detailed involvement between church and state,
such relationships will be considered excessive entanglement and,
hence, held constitutionally invalid. It is clear from both cases that as
in Allen, Everson, and Walz, the form of the aid itself remains the
most critical element because it determines the level of entanglement
which will be required to administer such aid. It is also clear that the
entanglement test of Walz is now the dominant hurdle for parochial
school aid to circumvent, rather than the Schempp-Allen primary effect
test, since even if the latter is satisfied (as it perhaps could have been in
the Lemon case), and even though primary effect remains a viable consideration in its own right, the aid could nonetheless spin a web of
entanglement deemed constitutionally impermissible. As a result of
Tilton, however, the Court now seems more willing to sanction direct
aid to sectarian institutions and appears even less concerned with the
incidental benefits which might accrue to religious organizations as a
result. This is in contrast to earlier cases where the Court relied more
heavily on general welfare or child-benefit theories as a measuring
device for permissibility. 119
What then are sanctionable forms of aid? And are all forms of aid
universally applicable? Previously implemented forms of aid such as
bus transportation and secular books are obviously acceptable, and this
is now settled law. Other so-called general welfare forms of aid such as
hot school lunches, medical examinations, and dental care would also
appear unobjectionable, as would other incidental items such as
academic prizes or awards. 120 But these forms of aid hardly alleviate in
significant ways the serious financial problems currently facing sectarian
schools. 1 21 The more formidable direct subsidy methods are, as
evidenced by Lemon, severely limited.
Although construction grants for buildings have been allowed for
119 See generally Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 US. 1 (1947); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
120 See Freund, supra note 3, at 1691.
121 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 8. This article discusses at length the
results of a special commission study ordered by Governor Rockefeller to assess the future
of nonpublic schools in New York State. The study predicted a 70 percent decrease in
the number of existing Roman Catholic elementary schools and a 50 percent decline in
Catholic high schools by 1980. Id.
The specific purpose of the study, however, was to examine several approaches to
the rectification of the fiscal difficulties which will be created by this demise. it was
determined that it would be cheaper for the state to absorb the students involved than
to subsidize the schools over this period of time, unless Catholic leadership agreed to
mass centralization, whereupon the cost advantage would shift in favor of subsidization.
Id. at 80, col. 1.
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colleges and universities at the federal level, similar aid by the states
to secondary schools is less easy to implement. In the first place, the
difficulty of providing purely secular buildings to elementary and high
schools is obvious. Such institutions rarely have either the acreage or
the basic organizational structure to feasibly permit construction of
separate language laboratory buildings, science buildings, libraries, and
so forth. Secondly, the Court's concern with political entanglement
between state governments and religion was much more pronounced
than at the federal level;12 2 consequently, it might hesitate to apply
the Tilton rationale to a state construction grant program for parochial
primary and secondary schools.
On the other hand, assuming that political entanglement objections could be overcome, some leeway could be expected regarding
construction grants at the lower educational levels. The "wing" or
"addition" concept could perhaps apply to some school complexes,
whereby a separation of secular from religious facilities could be effectively fashioned which would satisfy constitutional standards. For example, a gymnasium wing could be added to an existing parochial
school structure under a grant program, or a music or science wing, and
so on, which could be effectively kept secular with minimum effort and
entanglement. This compartmentalization of educational functions into
secular and nonsecular areas would be particularly possible in the
construction of new schools. Admittedly, this theory may "grasp at
straws" to some extent; however, it also appears that a genuine legal
viability is present.
A second possible consideration for a more substantial form of aid
is the establishment of a tax rebate or exemption program for the
benefit of parents who send their children to parochial schools. This
concept would, however, encounter extensive administrative complications due to the varied tax bases used to support public education in
states and municipalities. Furthermore, the applicability of such a program in any uniform fashion would be particularly difficult, if not
impossible, because of economic differences among the parents, property
owners and non-property owners, and so forth. This general type of
relief could also be legally equated with a primary effect of advancing
religion; hence, the tax exemption or rebate program appears to be
an untenable and unsuitable solution.
A third approach might be shared-time instruction in public
122 Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman,
son, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971).

403

US. 602, 622-24 (1971) with Tilton v. Richard-
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schools whereby participating parochial school children would be
124
treated as part-time public school children12 3-a Zorach v. Clauson
fact situation in reverse. Under this program, parochial school children
would be bused to public school locations to receive certain secular
instruction. While this program would be awkward to the sectarian
schools, it could provide some relief in the form of reducing its own
faculty expenses. Whether such a program is feasible from the public
school's point of view (referring to available teachers, physical capacity,
and the like) is another matter. Such a program would, however, represent a constitutionally acceptable form of aid within the Allen, Walz,
Tilton framework.
A corollary to a shared-time program might also take the form of a
public school teacher traveling to the sectarian school on a regular basis
to conduct secular education classes. This variation would, however, be
more constitutionally questionable as an excessive entanglement or an
advancement of religion-particularly if it were to be applied on a wide
scale and involved the hiring of additional public school teachers who,
in effect, were employed for the purpose of teaching parochial school
children (assuming the present force could not handle the additional
workload). Hence, this application would probably succeed only if it
were limited to infrequent or irregular occasions and involved highly
specialized forms of instruction (driver education, job or career counseling).
Finally, there remains the proposition of providing the type of
direct aid struck down in Pennyslvania and Rhode Island but without
the entangling provisions found objectionable by the Court, that is,
financial aid without comprehensive or continuing audits or inspections. The Court in Lemon strongly suggests through dicta that this
type of aid would also run afoul of the religion clauses, presumably because such aid would be assumed per se to have advanced religion:
The Rhode Island Legislature has not, and could not, provide state
aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachers under
religious discipline can avoid conflicts. The State must be certain,
given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate
religion ....

125

In summary, the Lemon and Tilton decisions appear to leave
few effective avenues open for massive government relief to the bulk
of primary and secondary parochial schools, and the Court has without
123
124
125

See Freund, supra note 3, at 1691.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
403 U.S. 602, 619 (emphasis added).

COMMENTS

1971]

reservation declared that it will not tolerate erosion of basic constitutional principles for the sake of expediency. On the other hand, it has
also recognized the continuing desirability and need for nonpublic
education and thus has expanded even further the scope of permissible
aid to include buildings and, more importantly, to sanction direct
federal aid to sectarian institutions for the first time. The Court having
struck this new line of demarcation for nonpublic school aid relationships, it now awaits the ingenuity of educators and legislators to use it
profitably for the essential preservation of nonpublic educational institutions, sectarian and nonsectarian alike.
A WORD
A.

ABOUT NEW JERSEY

Bus Transportation

New Jersey's role in the development of a body of constitutional
law regarding nonpublic school aid is significant because it was this
State's bus transportation statute which spawned the Everson case. 126
Although that statute was upheld, the State decided to deal expressly
with the subject in its State Constitution of 1947.127 The litigation did
not end there, however, and in Fox v. Board of Education of West
Milford Township,128 it was held that the statute did not authorize

transportation for nonpublic school children other than along established public school routes. Thereafter, the statute was amended to
eliminate the "established school route" provision and was further
amended a year later into its present form to place a limit of $150 on
29
the allowable amount of reimbursement.
1
The new statute was quickly challenged in McCanna v. Sills 30
as violative of the establishment clause, but was upheld. It was also
upheld shortly thereafter against a charge that it unfairly discriminated
against public school children in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1" 1 Neither decision was appealed.
126 Everson v. Board of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945),

aff'd 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The statute in dispute was Law of June 9, 1941, ch. 191, [1941] N.J.
Laws 581.

127 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, par. 3 provides:
The Legislature may, within reasonable limitations as to distance to be prescribed, provide for the transportation of children within the ages of five to
eighteen years inclusive to and from any school.
128 93 N.J. Super. 544, 226 A.2d 471 (L. Div. 1967).
129 The bus transportation statute is now N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:39-1 (1968).
130 103 N.J. Super. 480, 247 A.2d 691 (Ch. 1968).
131 Board of Educ. v. Gateway Regional High School, 104 N.J. Super. 76, 248 A.2d
564 (L. Div. 1968).
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The same issues arose again, however, in West Morris Regional Board
of Education v. Sills.1 32 Although the superior court again sustained the

statute as not violative of the establishment clause, it held that it did
indeed violate the equal protection clause. The basis for this ruling
was that the statute must confer its benefit upon all private school
students, without regard to the location of their residence, or must confer its benefit upon no one. Under the statute, bus service was not
provided to private school students in districts where there was no
public school transportation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously reversed the equal
protection violation 133 on the ground that the clause did not require
statewide uniformity in matters of this sort. 3 4 The court further stated
that the criteria employed by the legislature were not innately unreasonable, even though more suitable methods may have existed. 135 The
court also upheld the statute against establishment clause violations,
largely on the strength of Everson.136 Hence, the bus transportation
statute in New Jersey has solidly stood its constitutional ground despite
recent changes and it is not likely that it will be challenged again in
any meaningful way.
B.

Nonpublic School Aid
In 1970, New Jersey passed a comprehensive statute entitled the

Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act,

37

to take effect

on July 1, 1971. The Act included the purchase of secular educational
services,' 3

140
1 39
textbook reimbursement,'
teacher salary supplements,'

shared facilities provisions on a voluntary basis,' 41 and reimbursement,
inspection and audit procedures. 42 Much of the Act has, without doubt,
been rendered unconstitutional by the Lemon ruling since it contains
all the characteristics deemed unacceptable by the United States Supreme Court. The textbook provision, on the strength of Allen, appears
to be the only section that would survive constitutional scrutiny if the
New Jersey statute were challenged. Consequently, it is unlikely that
the Act will ever become operative, and the New Jersey Legislature
132 110 N.J. Super. 234, 265 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1970).
133 West Morris Regional Bd. of Educ. v. Sills, 58 N.J. 464, 279 A.2d 609 (1971).
134 Id. at 477, 279 A.2d at 616.
135 Id. at 479, 279 A.2d at 617.
136 Id. at 472, 279 A.2d at 613.
137 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:58-38 et seq. (Supp. 1971-72).
138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-42 (Supp. 1971-72).
139 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-43 (Supp. 1971-72).
140 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-46 (Supp. 1971-72).
141 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-47 (Supp. 1971-72).
142 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§18A:58-48, -49, -51, -52 (Supp. 1971-72).
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must return to the statutory drawing boards to forge some new method
to assist nonpublic education in meaningful constitutional ways.
C.

Construction Aid Programs
New Jersey also has its version of the federal statute challenged in
Tilton: the New Jersey Educational Facilities Authority Law. 143 There
is, however, a significant distinction between this law and the federal
statute. The federal act is a grant program, whereas the New Jersey
law provides for a loan or lease-back arrangement between the recipient
institution and the public corporation established to administer the
144
statutory program.
The law was challenged initially as a violation of provisions of
the State Constitution barring: (a) establishment of a religion; 145 (b)
donation by the state of land or money to private organizations;143 (c)
exceeding the debt limit of the state; 147 and (d) loaning the credit of
the state. 148 These charges were invalidated by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, however, in Clayton v. Kervick.149 In upholding the statute, the
court relied heavily on Roe v. Kervick,150 which construed as constitutional an urban redevelopment statute which permitted state loans
to private land developers engaged in urban renewal projects. In both
cases, the court stressed the need for flexibility in statutory and constitutional interpretation so as to permit the satisfaction of public needs
in the most effective manner. In Clayton, Justice Jacobs emphasized
this objective:
Those colleges and universities which participate will necessarily be expanding their educational facilities, thereby affording
substantial consideration to the State which is charged with a high
public duty in the field. The safeguards and controls contemplated
by the act . . . along with those in other statutory enactments
governing the licensure and conduct of New Jersey's institutions of
higher learning, are undoubtedly sufficient, for it must be borne in
143

N.J.

STAT. ANN. §§

144 N.J. STAT. ANN.
145

18A:72A-1 et seq. (1968).

§ 18A:72A-5 (1968).

N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 4 states in pertinent part:
There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another

146 N.J. CoNsr. art. VIll, § 3, par. 3 states:

No donation of land or appropriation of money shall be made by the State or
any county or municipal corporation to or for the use of any society, association
or corporation whatever.
147 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, par. 3.
148 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, par. 1 states:
The credit of the State shall not be directly or indirectly loaned in any case.
149 52 N.J. 138, 244 A.2d 281 (1968).
150 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964).
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mind that, unlike the situation in Roe, there is no danger here at
all that public funds may be diverted to private profit-making. By
their very creation and nature, the participating institutions are all
dedicated towards the faithful discharge of society's responsibility
and theirs for affording adequate opportunities for higher education. 151
Although the law was affirmed as against the State Constitution,
the parties returned to court to settle the issue as to whether or not it
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. In the second
Clayton v. Kervick 152 ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court again
sustained the Act. In this instance, the court determined that the statute
passed the Schempp-Allen test, 153 and it further distinguished the Act
from other forms of nonpublic school aid because it provided a necessary financing service on a self-sustaining basis (through bond issues) to
54
the recipient colleges and universities.1
Although the Walz case had been decided by that time (indeed, the
court cited the case' 55), the issue of entanglement was completely overlooked, and it is very likely that this exclusion caused the judgment to
be vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for further consideration in the light of the Lemon and Tilton rulings. 156 How well the
statute will withstand entanglement scrutiny is dubious, since the loan
or lease-back program appears to require more involved and continuing
contact between the church and state than is constitutionally permissible. It seems likely, therefore, that New Jersey will be required to
redraft its educational facilities law to more directly coincide with the
Court-approved federal statute. If this is done, Tilton holds forth the
promise that New Jersey's attempt on the state level to emulate the
federal example will not be struck down, and at least one sorely needed
area of nonpublic school aid will be allowed to continue in this State.
Paul H. Martin
52 N.J. at 156-57, 244 A.2d at 291.
56 N.J. 523, 267 A.2d 503 (1970).
153 Id. at 529, 267 A.2d at 506.
154 Id. at 530-31, 267 A.2d at 506-07.
155 Id. at 529, 267 A.2d at 506.
156 Kervick v. Clayton, vacated, 403 U.S. 945 (1971). A South Carolina case, Hunt v.
McNair, 255 S.C. 71, 177 S.E.2d 263 (1970), upholding a similar statute was also vacated
and remanded by the Court, 403 U.S. 945 (1971). At the time it decided Clayton, the New
Jersey Supreme Court may not have fully appreciated the extent to which the U.S. Supreme
Court was prepared to carry the Walz test. The Court, however, left no doubt as to this
issue by its subsequent decisions in Lemon and Tilton.
151
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